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NAZIS IN SKOKIE:
FIGHTING WORDS OR HECKLER'S VETO?
Mark A. Rabinowitz*
In Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party of America, the Illinois
Supreme Court declared that the display of the swastika before survivors
of the Holocaust could not be enjoined. To do so, according to the court,
would violate the party members' right to free expression under the First
Amendment. This author recognizes the right of the American Nazi Party
to express its political beliefs by demonstrating in the Village of Skokie
despite the prospect of violent opposition. However, Mr. Rabinowitz con-
tends that the Fighting Words Doctrine prohibits them from displaying the
swastika in an intentional attempt to inflict severe emotional distress upon
persons who are known to be peculiarly susceptible to such injury by
reason of a mental condition or peculiarity. This result, it is argued, ac-
commodates both the party members' interests in freedom of expression and
the Skokic residents' right to emotional well-being. Any other result, he
asserts, subverts an important legally protected value by blindly overex-
tending another value.
In January, 1978, the Illinois Supreme Court, in Village of Skokie v. Na-
tional Socialist Party of America,' declared that the display of the swastika
before survivors of the Holocaust in a march of the American Nazi Party in
Skokie, Illinois, could not be enjoined. To do so, according to' the court,
would violate the defendant party members' right to free expression under
the First Amendment.2 Although the controversial march never took place,
the Village of Skokie decision portends serious consequences for the con-
stitutional principles underlying the concept of freedom of speech.
The plaintiffs in Village of Skokie argued the applicability of the Fighting
Words Doctrine, which was announced in the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.3 The Chaplinsky case estab-
lished that the utterance of those words, "which by their very utterance
inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace," 4 is not
embraced within the protective cloak of the First Amendment and, there-
fore, can be prohibited or sanctioned. The history of the doctrine's develop-
ment is characterized by a steady contraction of its scope. In thirty-seven
years of judicial refinement of that principle, the Court has consistently re-
fused to approve the doctrine's application to those forms of expression pre-
sented in the cases brought before it. In those cases, the Court has invoked
* Associate Levy and Erens, Chicago, Illinois; B.A., University of Illinois; J.D., Harvard
University.
1. 69 I11. 2d 605, 373 N.E.2d 21 (1978).
2. Id. at 618, 373 N.E.2d at 25.
3. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
4. Id. at 572.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
the Heckler's Veto Doctrine 5 to forbid the restraint of expression which was
"merely offensive." 6
While the scope of the Fighting Words Doctrine was being contracted, a
significant development in tort law was occurring which may operate to ul-
timately preserve that doctrine's vitality-the recognition that a person's
emotional well-being is worthy of greater protection. 7  Thus, it is the prem-
ise of this Article that the net effect of these countervailing developments
is to preserve and reaffirm the core of the Fighting Words Doctrine, while
rejecting those applications which were never intended by its creators. It
will focus on the attempt of the American Nazi Party to march in the Village
of Skokie, a predominantly Jewish suburb of Chicago, as a case which pre-
sents a compelling argument for application of the core concept of the Fight-
ing Words Doctrine.
THE FACTUAL SETTING
The Village of Skokie, Illinois is a community of 70,000 residents situated
in the Chicago metropolitan area. 8 Approximately 40,500, or fifty-seven
percent, of its residents are of the Jewish religion, Jewish ancestry or both. 9
Included amongst the Jewish residents are hundreds of survivors of the Nazi
concentration camps and many thousands of persons whose families and
close relatives perished in the Nazi Holocaust.1 9
The National Socialist Party of America, otherwise known as the American
Nazi Party, is an organization, headquartered in Chicago, whose "goals are
similar to those of the German Nazi Party."'" In March, 1977, Frank Col-
5. See note 115 infra and accompanying text.
6. See note 116 infra and accompanying text.
7. Courts now recognize the intentional infliction of mental distress as a tort. Liability is
usually limited to acts of an especially flagrant character. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW
OF TORTS §12 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PRossEsR]. For a history of the development of
the law, see articles cited in PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS §11 n.9 (1941):
Bohlen, Right to Recover for Injury Resulting from Negligence Without Impact, 41 AM. L. REC.
141 (1902); Bohlen and Polikoff, Liability in Pennsylvania for Physical Effects of Fright, 80 U.
PA. L. REV. 627 (1932); Bohlen and Polikoff, Liability in New York for the Physical Conse-
quences of Emotional Disturbance, 32 COLUM. L. REv. 409 (1932); Goodrich, Emotional Distur-
bance as Legal Damage, 20 Micti. L. REV. 497 (1922); Green, "Fright" Cases, 27 ILL. L. REV.
761, 873 (1933); Hallen, Hill v. Kimball-A Milepost in the Law, 12 TEx. L. REV. 1 (1933);
Hallen, Damages for Physical Injuries Resulting from Fright or Shock, 19 VA. L. REv. 253
(1933); Harper and McNiely, A Re-examination of the Basis for Liability for Emotional Distur-
bance, Wis. L. REV. 426 (1938); Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of
Torts, 49 HARtv. L. REV. 1033 (1936); Throckniorton, Damages for Fright, 34 HAl\'. L. REV.
260 (1921) (remaining citations omitted); See also the summary in the Report of the New York
State Law Revision Commission, Study Relating to Liability for Injuries Resulting from Fright
or Shock, Legislative Doe. No. 65(E) (1936).
8. Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party, 51 111. App. 3d 279, 282, 366 N.E.2d 347,
349 (1st Dist. 1977).
9. id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 288, 366 N.E.2d at 353-54.
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lin, the leader of the American Nazi Party, sent a letter to officials of the
Village of Skokie announcing the Party's intention to conduct a march in the
village on May 1, 1977. The announced purpose of the march was to protest
a Skokie Park District requirement that conditioned the use of village parks
on the posting of a $350,000 insurance policy. The letter stated that traffic
would not be obstructed by the demonstration, which would consist of thirty
to fifty participants who would form a single-file picket line in front of the
Skokie Village Hall. The demonstrators would carry placards and banners
proclaiming slogans such as "Free Speech for the White Man," but would not
distribute handbills. Village officials were informed that the demonstrators
would not make derogatory public statements directed to any ethnic or re-
ligious group and would obey all laws.1 2 It was further announced that the
Nazi Party members participating in the march would wear their organiza-
tion's uniform, which consisted of "the storm trooper uniform of the German
Nazi Party embellished with the Nazi swastika."13
The announcement of the proposed march stirred great unrest among
Skokie residents.' 4  A leaflet was distributed by the Nazi Party which an-
nounced that they would march in Skokie because the community is "heavily
populated by the real enemy-the Jews." 15 Fifteen to eighteen Jewish or-
ganizations in the area planned counterdemonstrations in which 12,000 to
15,000 people were expected to participate.' 6 Fearing an uncontrollable
bloodbath, the Village of Skokie sought and was granted an order restraining
the Nazi Parts, from marching, walking, or parading in its uniform, fiom dis-
playing the swastika in any fashion, and from distributing any materials
which would incite hatred against persons of Jewish faith or any other
faith.17  On appeal, the First Appellate District affirmed in part and re-
versed in part.' 8 It held that the Village had failed to sustain its burden of
justifying the presumptively illegal prior restraint of expression except with
respect to the display of the swastika.' 9 This study will embrace only the
12. Id. at 283, 366 N.E.2d at 350.
13. Id. at 287, 366 N.E.2d at 353.
14. Id. at 282, 366 N.E.2d at 350.
15. Exhibit A attached to Plaintifls Complaint filed in Goldstein v. Collin, Docket No.
77-4367 (Cir. Ct. of Cook County Ch. 1978).
16. 51 111. App. 3d at 284, 366 N.E.2d at 351.
17. Id. at 284-85, 366 N.E.2d at 351. The order specifically prohibited the Nazi Party from
engaging in any of the following acts on May 1, 1977, within the Village of Skokie:
Marching, walking or parading in the uniform of the National Socialist Party of
America; Marching, walking or parading or otherwise displaying the swastika on or
off their person; Distributing pamphlets or displaying any materials which incite or
promote hatred against persons of Jewish faith or ancestry or hatred against persons
of any faith or ancestry, race or religion.
id.
18. Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party of America, 51 111. App. 3d 279, 366 N.E.2d
347 (1st Dist. 1977).
19. Id. at 282, 293, 366 N.E.2d at 349, 357. Relying upon Cohen v. California, the Illinois
Appellate Court observed that "[i]n the instant case, the evidence shows precisely that substan-
tial numbers of citizens are standing ready to strike out physically at whoever may assault their
sensibilities with the display of the swastika." Id. at 292, 366 N.E.2d at 356. Having satisfied a
1979]
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issue of whether the wearing of the swastika may be proscribed constitution-
ally.
Plaintiffs appealed to Illinois' highest court, where it was determined that
since the march could not be constitutionally enjoined, the only remaining
issue concerned the injunction of the display of the swastika. 20 Because the
display was found not to constitute "fighting words," it was held that it could
not be enjoined constitutionally.21
FIGHTING WORDS V. HECKLER'S VETO
Freedom of speech is commonly regarded as the most significant and deli-
cate of American democratic liberties.2 2 It presents a means of individual
self-fulfillment and a tool for the acquisition of knowledge and the ascertain-
ment of truth. 23 In a democracy, it is an essential prerequisite to self-
government. Thus, for Americans, freedom of expression is "the matrix, the
subjective test, the Court proceeded to apply the objective test enunciated in Chaplinsky. It
concluded that "[tihe swastika is a symbol which, as demonstrated by the record in this case
and as a matter of common knowledge, is inherently likely to provoke violent reaction among
those of the Jewish persuasion or ancestry when intentionally brought in close proximity to their
homes and places of worship." Id. at 293, 366 N.E.2d at 357. The Court further noted that "[i]f
the swastika would naturally offend thousands of Jewish persons in Skokie, then it must be said
that it would offend all those who respect the honestly held faith of their fellows, including the
ordinary citizen." Id. at 292, 366 N.E.2d at 357. After applying the subjective and objective
elements of the Fighting Words formulation and finding their conditions to be met, the Court
elaborated on the basis of its conclusion:
The swastika is a personal affront to every member of the Jewish faith, in remem-
bering the nearly consummated genocide of their people committed within memory
by those who used the swastika as their symbol. This is especially true for the
thousands of Skokie residents who personally survived the holocaust of the Third
Reich. They remember all too well the brutal destruction of their families by those
then wearing the swastika.
Id. at 293, 366 N.E.2d at 357.
20. 69 II. 2d at 611, 373 N.E.2d at 23. The Supreme Court of Illinois noted that "[tihe
appellate court opinion adequately discussed and properly decided those issues arising from the
portions of the injunction order which enjoined defendants from marching, walking, or parad-
ing, from distributing pamphlets or displaying materials, and from wearing the uniform of the
National Socialist Party of America." Id., 373 N.E.2d at 22-23. Therefore, the Court explained,
"[t]he onlv issue remaining before this court is whether the circuit court order enjoining defend-
ants from displaying the swastika violates the first amendment rights of those defendants." Id.,
373 N.E.2d at 23.
21. Id. at 615, 373 N.E.2d at 24.
22. First Amendment freedoms have been accorded special protection as compared to other
constitutional rights. For a general discussion of whether the "preferred position" of First
Amendment liberties is justified, see 0. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAw 1041-54 (9th ed. 1975). A thorough collection of judicial statements in favor of
the preferred position proposition appears in McKay, The Preference for Freedom, 34 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1182, 1223-27 (1959). justice Cardozo best expressed the justification for the special
respect accorded First Amendment liberties in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), stat-
ing that freedom of speech and thought is "the matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly
every other form of freedom." Id. at 327.
23. T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6-7 (1970).
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indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom." 24  Yet,
"[a~ll declare for liberty and proceed to disagree among themselves as to its
true meaning."
25
Debate has raged over the issue of whether the right to free speech
should be considered "absolute" and unabridgable or whether competing
governmental interests may outweigh such rights. Mr. Justice Black has
been most closely identified with the absolutist school of thought. In his
dissent in Konigsberg v. State Bar of California,26 he rejected "the doctrine
that permits constitutionally protected rights to be 'balanced' away when a
majority of this Court thinks that a State might have interest sufficient
to justify abridgement of those freedoms." 27  Rather, he argued, "the
First Amendment's unequivocal command that there shall be no abridge-
ment of the rights of free speech and assembly shows that the men who
drafted our Bill of Rights did all the 'balancing' that was to be done in this
field." 
28
However, not even the so-called "absolutists" would forbid all regulation
relating to speech. Therefore, they too must decide under what cir-
cumstances such regulation is to be tolerated. Not all expressive activity is
speech, and a manner must be devised for determining when expression is
not protected by the First Amendment because it is a "verbal act."29
Further, only abridgements of free speech are forbidden, and such pro-
scribed restraints must be distinguished from reasonable regulation. 30  In the
final analysis, all absolutists fix some limit beyond which speech is not pro-
tected 31 and must therefore employ some form of balancing test.
The absolutists have embraced a categorization approach by which certain
limited categories of expression, such as libel, obscenity, or fighting words,
are deemed to be outside the scope of constitutional protection. Pursuant to
this scheme, all protected speech is totally insulated from direct abridge-
ment. 32  However, in determining whether a particular form of expression
falls within a category'of unprotected speech the balance test must once
again inform the decision. Moreover, "[a]ny exclusion of a class of activities
24. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937).
25. Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 625 (1951).
26. 366 U.S. 36 (1961).
27. Id. at 61 (Black, J., dissenting).
28. Id.
29. Gompers v. Bucks Stove and Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 439 (1911).
30. See McKay, The Preference for Freedom, 34 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1182 (1959) [hereinafter
cited as McKay], where the author points out that
[aifter all, the amendment only forbids "abridging the freedom of speech." So what
seems at first glance to be an absolute prohibition is seen on investigation to permit
an inquiry into at least two subsidiary questions: (1) when does speech lose its
protection because it is not speech but "verbal acts?"; and (2) where should the line
be drawn between "abridging," which is flatly forbidden, and reasonable regulation,
which may in some circumstances be permissible?
id. at 1194.
31. McKay, supra note 30, at 1194.
32. Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 69 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting).
19791
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from first amendment safeguards represents an implicit conclusion that the
governmental interests in regulating those activities are such as to justify
whatever limitation is thereby placed on the free expression of ideas."
33
Because even the absolutist approach must "balance, or employ a clear and
present danger test, at some point," 34 the debate over the absolutism versus
balancing issue is merely an exercise in metaphysics. The absolutist versus
balancing approach is a conflict underlying the inquiry as to whether the
display of the swastika in Skokie under those particular circumstances consti-
tutes "fighting words," subject to valid restraint, or whether such restraint
would confer an unconstitutional Heckler's Veto.
The Fighting WIords Doctrine
Although freedom of speech is commonly regarded as the most important
and fragile of American democratic liberties, it has never required that all
expression remain unrestrained under all circumstances. In Chaplinsky b.
New Hampshire,35 the Supreme Court recognized "certain well-defined and
narrowly limited classes of speech" which may be constitutionally restrained,
including obscenity, profanity, libel, and "fighting words." 36 The refusal to
provide First Amendment protection to these categories was based on their
lack of social value.
3 7
33. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 583 (1978) [hereinafter cited as L. TRIBE].
34. Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in
First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1482, 1501 (1975).
35. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
36. Id. at 572.
37. Id. This proclamation of the Fighting Words Doctrine emerged from a case in which
Chaplinsky, a member of the Jehovah's Witnesses religious sect, was distributing literature on a
public street. A crowd had gathered and the City Marshal warned Chaplinsky that the crowd
was getting restless and upset because he was denouncing religion as a racket. Id. at 570.
"Some hours later, the crowd got out of hand and treated Chaplinsky with some violence."
State v. Chaplinsky, 91 N.H. 310, 313, 18 A.2d 754, 758 (1941). Although no arrests were
made, a police officer who was present at the disturbance brought Chaplinsky to the police
station for his own protection. Id. at 313, 18 A.2d at 758. While en route to the station the City
Marshal appeared. Chaplinsky claimed that the City Marshal called him a "damn bastard."
Evidently, the Marshal denied that allegation. Id. at 316, 18 A.2d at 759. The complaint
charged that Chaplinsky called the Marshal "a God damned racketeer" and "a damned Fascist"
and characterized the local government as "Fascists or agents of Fascists." Chaplinsky v. New
Hamphire, 315 U.S. 568, 569 (1942). Chaplinsky was convicted of violating a state statute which
prohibited the use of any "offensive, derisive or annoying" language in a public place. Id. The
state court had construed the statute to forbid only such words "as have a direct tendency to
cause acts of violence by the persons to whom, individually, the remark is addressed." Id. at
573. The state court had further held that, in applying the statute, "[tlhe word 'offensive' is not
to be defined in terms of what a particular addressee thinks. . . . The test is what men of
common intelligence would understand would be words likely to cause an average addressee to
fight." Id. The United States Supreme Court held that the statute, as authoritatively construed
by the state court, was narrowly drawn so as to punish only "the use in a public place of words
likely to cause a breach of the peace," id., and therefore did not apply to constitutionally pro-
tected expression. The Court affirmed Chaplinsky's conviction, concluding that "the appellations
'damned racketeer' and 'damned Fascist' are epithets likely to provoke the average person to
retaliation, and thereby cause a breach of the peace." Id. at 574.
[Vol. 28:259
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The import of the Chaplinsky holding was that the utterance of "fighting
words" could be prevented or punished as an exercise of a State's power to
preserve public order. Those utterances, which under the Fighting Words
Doctrine were not embraced within the protective cloak of the First
Amendment, were limited to "those which by their very utterance inflict
injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace." 38 However, in
applying this formula, the Court cautioned, the addressee's subjective reac-
tion to the utterance is not controlling. "The test is what men of common
intelligence would understand would be words likely to cause an average
addressee to fight."
39
The Fighting Words Doctrine is grounded in the premise that utterances
which are thinly veiled assaults need not be tolerated in a society which
otherwise enshrines the individual's right to unrestrained expression. An in-
dividual's right to speak and act as he pleases ends where it collides with the
rights of others to be free from activity which rises to the level of a physical
assault. The Court's formulation of the doctrine was justified by reference to
its vision of freedom of speech as limited in its purpose to protecting the
"exposition of ideas" as a step toward the ascertainment of truth. 40  The
First Amendment is seen as an instrument to preserve the integrity of the
"marketplace of ideas" 4 1 which is essential to the development of "rational
social judgment"'4 2 and "self-fulfillment." 43 From the monocular perspec-
tive of this vision of freedom of expression, it follows that utterances which
do not represent an "exposition of ideas" are of "such slight social value as a
step to truth" that they may be prevented or punished in the public in-
terest. 
44
As formulated in Chaplinsky, the Fighting Words Doctrine contains two
facets. A State may constitutionally proscribe such utterances which by their
very nature (1) inflict injury, or (2) tend to incite an immediate breach of the
peace. Although only the latter was involved in Chaplinsky, the Court
nevertheless saw fit to embrace a bipartite formulation. It did not specify the
type or the degree of harm which would qualify as "injury," but at least one
commentator has suggested that the first element in the Chaplinsky formula-
tion "concerns the prevention of injury other than physical, primarily emo-
tional upset and injury to the 'sensibilities' of addressees or auditors." 45 The
second element refers to the prevention of a disturbance of the peace arising
from an addressee's violent response to inherently provocative utterances. 46
Case-by-case applications of the doctrine by the Court infused this general
formulation with a more specific meaning.
38. Id. at 572.
39. Id. at 573.
40. Id. at 572.
41. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
42. T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPREssioN 7 (1970).
43. Id. at 6.
44. Chaplinsky v. New Hamphire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
45. Rutzick, Offensive Language and the Evolution of First Amendment Protection, 9 HARV,
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 6 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Rutzick].
46. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942).
1979]
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Thirty-seven years -after Chaplinsky, the Fighting Words Doctrine stands
significantly refined. Although words which by their very utterance inflict
injury are still considered "fighting words," it is only when substantial pri-
vacy interests are invaded in an essentially intolerable manner that prevent-
able injury will be found to exist. The major case in the development of the
doctrine is Cohen v. California,47 in which the defendant was arrested for
wearing a jacket bearing the words "Fuck the Draft" in the corridor of a
municipal courthouse where women and children were present.4, He was
convicted of violating a statute which prohibited "maliciously and willfully
disturb[ing] the peace or quiet of any neighborhood or person . . . by ...
offensive conduct." 
4 9
Cohen v. California refined the Fighting Words Doctrine in five significant
respects. First, in holding that Cohen's offensive message was "not directed
to the person of the hearer," 50 the Court was formulating an "actual ad-
dressee test" 51 dependent upon whether an "individual actually or likely to be
present could reasonably have regarded the words [uttered] as a direct per-
sonal insult." 52 The Fighting Words Doctrine, then, is restricted to contexts
where an actual addressee of the offensive message is present. In effect, the
Court was saying to the occupants of the courthouse, "You can't complain
because he wasn't talking to you." In order to determine whether the mes-
sage was directed to the actual hearer the court formulated a common sense
test based on a reasonable interpretation of the context of the utterance.
53
Second, the Court added a subjective element to the objective test formu-
lated by Chaplinsky. In Chaplinsky, the Court adopted a State court rule
that eschewed concern with "what a particular addressee thinks." 54  The
Court there noted that "Itihe test is what men of common intelligence would
understand would be words likely to cause an average addressee to
fight." 55 The Court applied this objective test in Cohen and concluded that
47. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
48. Cohen entered a courtroom, "removed his jacket and stood with it folded over his arm.
Meanwhile, a policeman sent the presiding judge a note suggesting that Cohen Ie held in
contempt of court. The judge declined to do so and Cohen was arrested by the officer only after
he emerged from the courtroom." Id. at 19 n.3.
49. Id. at 16.
50. Id. at 20.
51. Shea, 'Don't Bother to Smile When You Call Me That'-Fighting Words and the First
Amendment, 63 Ky. L.J. 1, 22 (1975).
52. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971).
53. One commentator has opined that the Court's language restricts the fighting words doc-
trine to the context of a face-to-face confrontation and rejects the proposition that the reaction of
"onlookers" or "members of a general group addressed by the speaker" is relevant. Rutzick,
supra note 45, at 21. However, this conclusion is not supported by the Court's opinion. To the
extent that an "onlooker" or "members of a general group addressed by the speaker" constitute
persons "actually or likely to be present" who "could reasonably have regarded the words [ut-
tered] as a direct personal insult," they meet the actual addressee test and trigger application of
the Fighting Words Doctrine.
54. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942).
55. Id.
[Vol. 28:259
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a reasonable interpretation of the words on appellant's jacket would not lead
an individual actually or likely to be present to regard the words as a direct
personal insult. 56 However, the Court went further and seemed to apply a
test based on a subjective inquiry: would a substantial number of citizens
stand ready to strike out physically in response to the offensive words?
57
Third, the Court held that an "undifferentiated fear or apprehension of
disturbance" is insufficient to trigger application of the Fighting Words Doc-
trine. 58 Rather, it must be shown that persons are likely "to strike out
physically" at the offensive utterance. 59 In so holding, the Court reiterated
its earlier conclusion that the Fighting Words Doctrine is limited to situa-
tions in which the expression is "likely to produce a clear and present
danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience,
annoyance, or unrest." 60
Fourth, the Court defined the type of injury that justifies invocation of the
Fighting Words Doctrine. It held that the grievant must show an invasion of
"substantial privacy interests" in a manner so "essentially intolerable" that
the government is justified in prohibiting the discourse.
61
Fifth, the Court noted that the First Amendment protects both cognitive
and emotive elements of communication. The Court's conclusion that Co-
hen's expression was constitutionally protected was based in part on its con-
clusion that he used the offensive expletive as a conveyer of emotion rather
than of substantive content. Thus, Cohen was merely expressing disapproval
of the selective service system in an emotional tone. He simply chose an
emotive word rather than a loud voice to convey the intensity of his convic-
tions. The Court thus recognized the "dual communicative function" of ex-
pression: "[I]t conveys not only ideas capable of relatively precise, detached
explication, but otherwise inexpressible emotions as well. In fact, words are
often chosen as much for their emotive as their cognitive force." 62  The
Constitution protects emotion as well as cognition, the Court observed, since
the former "may often be the more important element of the overall mes-
sage sought to be communicated." 63  Thus, the Cohen Court reflected a
vision of freedom of expression that was far wider in scope than that en-
visioned by the Chaplinsky Court. The Chaplinsky Court recognized the
protection of the "exposition of ideas" 64 as the only purpose of freedom of
speech, while the Cohen Court envisioned a broader role for First Amend-
ment freedoms.
65
56. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971).
57. Id. at 23.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
61. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971).
62. Id. at 26.
63. Id.
64. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
65. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971). The Court here embraced a belief that a
wide scope of freedom of expression "will ultimately produce a more capable citizenry and more
1979]
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The Cohen conclusion may be interpreted as a logical extension of the
doctrinal trend established by the Chaplinsky offspring. From its inception,
the Fighting Words Doctrine was limited in its application by the Court.
The first important post-Chaplinsky case was Terrniniello v. Chicago,
66
where defendant's appeal from a conviction for disorderly conduct went to
the United States Supreme Court in 1949.6 7 In reversing Terminiello's
conviction, the Court did not decide the issue of whether his offensive re-
marks could be punished as fighting words. Instead, it found that the par-
ticular ordinance involved was overbroad and therefore unconstitutional. The
ordinance at issue had been interpreted to forbid speech which "stirs the
public to anger, invites dispute, brings about a condition of unrest, or
creates a disturbance." 6 8 The Court held that all except the last of these
grounds were constitutionally protected speech, and reversed the conviction
because the verdict did not specify which of the grounds had been relied
upon in support of the conviction.
69
Although the Terminiello Court did not profess to further hone the defini-
tion of "fighting words," the doctrine was refined by implication in this fa-
mous opinion written by Justice Douglas. The Justice stated that a funda-
mental function of free speech is to nourish healthy dispute. Thus the Court
held that effects of offensive speech such as stirring the public to anger,
inviting dispute, or creating a condition of unrest may indeed be welcome
consequences under a policy of free speech for a citizenship.7 0 Hence, such
effects clearly do not constitute preventable injury under the Fighting Words
Doctrine. In thus giving substance to the Chaplinsky test, the Court held
perfect polity and . . . comport with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon which
our political system rests."
66. 337 U.S. 1 (1949). Terminiello involved a conviction for disorderly conduct in violation
of a city ordinance which proscribed the making of "any improper noise, riot, disturbance,
breach of the peace, or diversion tending to a breach of the peace." Id. at 2 n.1. Terminiello
had addressed an audience of approximately eight hundred persons who had assembled in an
auditorium to hear him speak under the auspices of the Christian Veterans of America. Two
hundred fifty persons had been refused admittance because the auditorium was filled to capac-
ity. Approximately one thousand persons gathered outside the auditorium to protest the address
and violence occurred. The address had consisted of a vicious attack on Zionist Jews and there
was conflicting testimony as to the audience's reaction. Id. at 3.
67. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
68. Id. at 3.
69. Id. at 5.
70. Id. at 4. In the now famous passage, Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, stated that
a function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. It
may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest,
creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger.
Speech is often provocative and challenging. It may strike at prejudices and precon-
ceptions and have profound unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea.
That is why freedom of speech, though not absolute, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire
[citation omitted], is nevertheless protected against censorship or punishment, un-
less shown likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil
that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest.
[Vol. 28:259
1979] FIGHTING WORDS OR HECKLER'S VETO 269
that expression does not forfeit its constitutionally protected status merely
because the addressee becomes emotionally upset upon hearing the utter-
ance. Most significantly, the Court held that the restraint of fighting words
must be limited to those contexts in which the utterance was "likely to pro-
duce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far
above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest." 
7 1
The Court continued to refine the doctrine, deciding Street v. New
York72 in 1969. Street involved a statute forbidding the mere utterance of
defiant remarks concerning the flag. 73  In reversing Street's conviction
because the statute involved would allow Street's words alone to be an inde-
pendent source of his conviction, 74 the Court held that his utterances con-
cerning the flag did not amount to fighting words tending to incite an im-
mediate breach of the peace. 75 The most important aspect of the Street
holding was a rejection of the proposition that expression could be punished
because it offends a hearer 76 or shocks a hearer's sensibilities; 77 the
71. Id.
72. 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
73. Street was convicted for violating a statute forbidding one to "publicly mutilate, deface,
defile, or defy, trample upon, or cast contempt upon either by words or act" any American flag.
Id. at 578. He had learned from a radio news report that civil rights leader James Meredith had
been shot. Believing that inadequate protection of Meredith by law enforcement authorities had
allowed the shooting, Street became outraged. He carried his own American flag outside to a
street corner and, as a protest, set it ablaze and dropped it on the pavement to burn. A police
officer observed the burning flag and found Street addressing an audience of five to ten persons
on the street corner. An additional thirty persons stood near the flag. The officer testified that
he heard Street say, "We don't need no damn flag." The policeman asked Street if he had
burned the flag and he replied, "Yes; that is my flag; I burned it. If they let that happen to
Meredith we don't need an American flag." Id. at 578-79.
74. The Court overturned Street's conviction because the statute improperly forbade the
mere utterance of defiant remarks concerning a flag. The Court held that "Street's words could
have been an independent cause of his conviction," and because his utterances constituted
"public advocacy of peaceful change in our institutions," and were constitutionally protected, "a
conviction for uttering such words would violate the Constitution."
75. Id. at 592. The Court stated that "[t]hough it is conceivable that some listeners might
have been moved to retaliate upon hearing appellant's disrespectful words, [it] cannot [be saidj
that appellant's remarks were so inherently inflammatory as to come within that small class of
'fighting words' which are 'likely to provoke the average person to retaliation, and thereby cause
a breach of the peace."' Id.
76. Id. The Court noted that "any shock effect of appellant's speech must be attributed to
the content of the ideas expressed" and concluded that "under our Constitution the public
expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to
some of their hearers." Id.
77. Id. at 592. One commentator has suggested that "the Court's reference to 'sensibilities'
is of special note because it marked the first explicit statement by the Court that 'sensibilities,'
denominated as such, are a protectible interest and the first clarification by the Court of its
statement in Chaplinsky that words which 'inflict injury' but threaten no violent reaction are
punishable." Rutzick, supra note 45, at 14. Other commentators have reached the opposite
conclusion concerning the same language and characterize it as a rejection of the proposition
that a state interest in protecting the sensibilities of an addressee from the impact of offensive
language justifies restraining that expression. One commentator argues that protection of ad-
dressees from shock was "rejected" by the Court in Street as "an interest supporting suppres-
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mere effect of offending or shocking a speaker does not constitute preventable
injury under the Fighting Words Doctrine.
Also in 1969, the Court decided the significant case of Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District.7 8  In this case, one junior
high school and two high school students were suspended for wearing black
arm bands to school in order to protest the Viet Nam War. The students'
fathers brought a suit seeking nominal damages and an injunction restraining
school officials from disciplining the students for an exercise of constitution-
ally protected expression.
79
The Court ruled in favor of the students, noting that "[t]he school officials
banned and sought to punish petitioners for a silent, passive expression of
opinion, unaccompanied by any disorder or disturbance on the part of
petitioners." 80 Because "[t]here is no indication that the work of the
schools or any class was disrupted," the Court continued, "this case does not
concern speech or action that intrudes upon the work of the schools or the
rights of other students." '8 1
The Court rejected the school's assertion that their fear of a disturbance
justified the restraint of expression, stating that "undifferentiated fear or ap-
prehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right of freedom of
expression." 82 Thus, although the Court did not refer to the Fighting
Words Doctrine by name, its decision was grounded in the conclusion that
the expression was not likely to incite an immediate breach of the peace.
Tinker also represents a further refinement of the definition of preventable
"injury" in the Fighting Words formulation to exclude "the discomfort and
unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint." 8 3  In this
sense, it is a restatement of the holding of Street v. New York.
The line of development established by Terminiello, Street, and Tinker
was culminated in Cohen. One year after Cohen, the Court considered
sion of words." Nimmer, The Meaning of Symbolic Speech under the First Amendment, 21
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 29, 55 (1973). Another commentator stated that "The Court ... rejected any
state interest in preserving the sensibilities of passers-by." Bell & Mitchell, First Amendment
Protection of Symbolic Speech: Flag Cases Raise the Standard, 8 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 689, 698
n.41 (1975). However, far from constituting an explicit statement of approval or rejection, the
ambiguously worded passage is at most a carelessly worded attempt to dismiss that contention.
The Court added to the confusion with. this remark in the Street opinion: "Even if such a
conviction might be upheld on the ground of 'shock,' there is again no indication that the state
courts regarded the statute as limited to that purpose." Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592
(1969). Nevertheless, the Court cited Street as a repudiation of the existence of a state interest
in protecting the sensibilities of hearers. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 412 (1974).
78. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
79. Id. at 504.
80. Id. at 508.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 509. The Court announced that "[i]n order for the State in the person of school
officials to justify prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, it must be able to show that
its action was caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and un-
pleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint." Id.
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the Fighting Words Doctrine in Gooding v. Wilson.84 Wilson had partici-
pated in an antiwar demonstration in front of U.S. Army Headquarters. The
demonstrators blocked the building's entrance in order to prevent the en-
trance of inductees. A police request to permit access to the building was
refused and a fight ensued as police officers attempted to clear the entrance.
During the struggle, Wilson addressed the following remarks to two police
officers: "White son of a bitch, I'll kill you;" "You son of a bitch, I'll choke
you to death;" "You son of a bitch, if you ever put your hands on me again,
I'll cut you all to pieces." 5 Wilson was convicted of violating a statute
which forbade the use of "opprobrious words or abusive language, tending to
cause a breach of the peace."
8 6
The Court began its opinion by reaffirming the power of a State "constitu-
tionally to punish 'fighting' words under carefully drawn statutes not also
susceptible of application to protected expression."86 In the instant case, the
Court noted, the statute "makes it a 'breach of the peace' merely to speak
words offensive to some who hear them, and so sweeps too broadly." 87
Thus, the Court concluded, the statute is unconstitutionally overbroad be-
cause it is not limited to forbidding only such words that "have a direct
tendency to cause acts of violence by the person to whom, individually, the
remark is addressed." 88  In order to survive constitutional scrutiny, statutes
must be narrowly drawn so as to forbid only such utterances that are likely
to provoke "an immediate violent response" by the actual addressee.8 9
Later that year the Court remanded three cases for reconsideration in
light of Cohen and Gooding. All three cases concerned state statutes which
prohibited obscene or offensive language.9 0 In Rosenfeld v. New Jersey 91
and Brown v. Oklahoma,92 the defendants, while publicly addressing large
84. 405 U.S. 51.8 (1972).
85. Id. at 519 n.1.
86. Id. at 519.
86a. Id. at 523 [citations omitted].
87. Id. at 527.
88. Id. at 524.
89. Id. at 528.
90. In Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901 (1972), the defendant was convicted of disor-
derly conduct in violation of a statute which prohibited the uttering of "loud and offensive or
profane or indecent language" in a public place. Id. at 904 (Powell, J., dissenting).
In Brown v. Oklahoma, 408 U.S. 914 (1972), the defendant was convicted of violating a
statute which forbade the utterance of "any obscene or lascivious language or word in any public
place or in the presence of females." Id. at 911 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
In Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 408 U.S. 913 (1972), the defendant was convicted of a
breach of the peace in violation of a city ordinance forbidding one "to curse or revile or to use
obscene or opprobrious language toward or with reference to any member of the city police
while in the actual performance of his duty." Id. at 909-10 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The
Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Gooding. Id.
at 913.
91. 408 U.S. 901 (1972). The facts of this case appear in the dissenting opinion of Justice
Powell. Id. at 904.
92. 408 U.S. 914 (1972). The facts of this case appear in the dissenting opinion of Justice
Rehnquist. Id. at 911.
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audiences, adjectived their remarks with four-letter profanities. 93  In re-
manding the cases the Court relied on Cohen to support the proposition
that expression may not be silenced merely because it offends the sen-
sibilities of its hearers. The Court also relied on Gooding in both cases to
reiterate that the Fighting Words Doctrine is limited to those contexts in
which the utterance creates a clear and present danger of a violent response
by the addressee. Thus, if there was no clear and present danger that the
audience would resort to violence in response to the speaker's remarks, such
expression could not be restrained even under a narrowly drafted statute.
Rosenfeld elicited a sharp dissent from Justice Powell. The Justice felt that
although certain offensive words are unlikely to result in physical violence,
they may offend so grossly and be so emotionally disturbing as to warrant an
exception to First Amendment protection.
94
The third case involved profanity addressed to a policeman. In Lewis v.
City of New Orleans,95 the police were arresting Mrs. Lewis' son when she
intervened and addressed the officer as the "god damn motherfucker
police." 96 The Court relied again on Gooding to remanLthe case. 97 Lewis
involved an ordinance which prohibited the use of obscene language when
addressing a policeman who is performing his duties. 98 Since the statute's
93. In Rosenfeld, the defendant addressed a public school board meeting attended by an
audience of one hundred fifty people, including forty children and twenty-five women. In the
course of his remarks, he used the adjective "motherfucking" four times to describe the
teachers, the school board, the town, and the United States. The State courts had previously
limited the applicable statute's scope, see note 90 supra, to forbid only words "likely to incite
the hearer to an immediate breach of the peace or to be likely, in the light of the gender and
age of the listener and the setting of the utterance, to affect the sensibilities of a hearer."
Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901, 904 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting), quoting State v.
Protaci, 56 N.J. 346, 353, 266 A.2d 579, 583-84 (1970).
In Brown, the defendant addressed an audience of men and women at the University of Tulsa
and presented the Black Panther Party view of current issues. During the course of his remarks,
he characterized local police officers as "motherfucker fascist pig cops" and referred to one
particular officer as a "black motherfucker pig." Brown v. Oklahoma, 408 U.S. 914, 911 (1972)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
94. Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901, 905-06 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting). The Jus-
tice stated that "[plerhaps appellant's language did not constitute 'fighting words' within the
meaning of Chaplinsky. While most of those attending the school board meeting were undoubt-
edly outraged and offended, the good taste and restraint of such an audience may have made it
unlikely that physical violence would result. Moreover, the offensive words were not directed at
a specific individual." Id. at 905. However, Justice Powell argued, "the exception to the First
Amendment protection recognized in Chaplinsky is not limited to words whose mere utterance
entails a high probability of an outbreak of physical violence. It also extends to the willful use of
scurrilous language calculated to offend the sensibilities of an unwilling audience." Id. at 905.
He further explained that "a verbal assault on an unwilling audience may be so grossly offensive
and emotionally disturbing as to be the proper subject of criminal proscription." Id. at 906.
95. 408 U.S. 913 (1972).
96. The facts of this case appear in the dissenting opinion of Justice Rehnquist. Id. at 909.
See also note 91 supra for the applicable statute.
97. Id. at 913.
98. See note 90 supra.
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prohibition was not limited to words creating a clear and present danger of a
violent reaction, the statute was overbroad. 99 Moreover, the Court may
have believed that the circumstances precluded application of the Fighting
Words Doctrine even under a narrowly drawn statute, since a police officer
can be presumed to be capable of absorbing verbal abuse without respond-
ing with violence.' 00
99. Upon remand, the Louisiana Supreme Court sustained Lewis' conviction. The United
States Supreme Court then reversed the conviction and held that the statute was overbroad
because it forbade the use of words which do not "by their very utterance inflict injury or tend
to incite an immediate breach of the peace." Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 132
(1974).
100. Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 408 U.S. 913 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring). In his
concurrence, Justice Powell stated that "[ilf these words had been addressed by one citizen to
another, face to face and in a hostile manner, I would have no doubt that they would be
'fighting words.' But the situation may be different where such words are addressed to a police
officer trained to exercise a higher degree of restraint than the average citizen." Id. at 913.
An offspring of Lewis is Lucas v. Arkansas, 416 U.S. 919 (1974). In Lucas, a policeman
investigating a disturbance heard one of the occupants of a car say: "Well, there goes the big,
bad motherfucking cops." He ignored the remark and parked behind a sign. One of the occu-
pants then said: "Look at the chicken shit motherfucker hid over there behind that sign." As the
officer approached the car, one of the occupants said: "Now the sorry son-of-a-bitch is going to
come back over here." Id. at 919 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The occupants were convicted of
breach of the peace in violation of a statute that forbade the "use of any profane, violent, vulgar,
abusive or insulting language toward or about any other person ... which language in its
common acceptation is calculated to arouse to anger the person about or to whom it is spoken
or addressed, or to cause a breach of the peace or assault." The Court vacated the judgment
and remanded the case in light of Lewis. Id. at 920. See also id. at 919, where the facts of this
case appear in the dissenting opinion of Justice Blackmun.
Apparently the statute was considered overbroad since it was not limited to forbidding fight-
ing words. Justice Douglas noted that it "does not even require that the words be calculated to
cause a breach of the peace; it is enough that they are calculated to arouse anger in the
addressee." Id. at 930 (Appendix to opinion of Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun, in
dissent, protested that the statute was not overbroad since it "restricts the fact-finder to lan-
guage that would, in its common or ordinary acceptation, be calculated to cause a breach of the
peace." Id. at 920-21 n.2. He argued that the Court had strayed from the Chaplinsky formula-
tion. The Justice contended the following:
[T]he statute on its face does not permit or require an inquiry into the respective
boiling points of the particular individuals or groups involved in each case ...In
Chaplinsky, the Court accepted a limiting construction which held that the statute
was "not to be defined in terms of what a particular addressee thinks ...The test
is what men of common intelligence would understand would be words likely to
cause an average addressee to fight.
Id. at 920 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun quoted the opinion of the State
court which held that the utterances were punishable because "they were calculated to arouse to
anger the officer to whom they were spoken or addressed." Id. at 920, quoting Lucas v. State,
254 Ark. 584, 589-90, 494 S.W.2d 705, 708 (1943). He then exclaimed:
I am at a loss to understand what this Court further requires in a narrowing in-
terpretation under its version of the Chaplinsky standard espoused in Gooding. Ap-
parently, not only must every statute regulating speech in the 50 States parrot the
wording the Court desires, but a state court must play the role of a ventriloquist's
dummy mouthing ceremonial phrases in order to obtain the. seal of this Court's
approval.
Id. at 920-21. Justice Blackmun essentially criticized the Court for distinguishing between a
"state of anger" and "a clear and present danger of violent conduct." However, this ignores the
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Thus, after thirty-seven years of evolution, the Fighting Words Doctrine
applies only where an expression will, by its very utterance, inflict injury or
tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. 10 1 Effects of offensive
speech such as stirring the public to anger,10 2 inviting dispute,10 3 creating a
condition of unrest, 10 4 offending a hearer, 10 5 offending a hearer's personal
predilections, 10 6 shocking a hearer's sensibilities, 0 7 or creating the discom-
fort and unpleasantness that naturally accompany the airing of an unpopu-
lar viewpoint, 10 8 will not constitute injuries to be protected under the doc-
trine. Only when substantial privacy interests are invaded in an essentially
intolerable manner does preventable "injury" exist. 10 9 This means that
"fighting words" will usually be limited definitively to contexts in which the
utterance constitutes a direct personal insult. 110 In analyzing whether or
not the doctrine should apply in a particular case, it is important to note that
the Court has stated that First Amendment protection embraces both emo-
tion and cognition. Words do not forfeit their constitutionally protected
status merely because they appeal to emotion."'
The immediate breach of the peace requirement is as stringent as the
injury requirement. There must be a clear and present danger of an im-
mediate breach of the peace in order to inhibit the expression. 112 An undif-
ferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance cannot operate to silence the
speaker. 1 13  The clear and present danger of violence must be manifested
both objectively and subjectively. 114
Heckler's Veto Doctrine: The Problem of Hostile Audiences
The logical converse of the Fighting Words Doctrine is the Heckler's Veto
Doctrine. 115 The principle underlying the Heckler's Veto Doctrine is that
role that restraint plays in preventing the former from becoming the latter. Moreover, the
Terminiello case had already incorporated the distinction into the fighting words doctrine.
101. Chaplinsky v. United States, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
102. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
106. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
107. Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
108. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 15 (1971).
109. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 408 U.S. 913 (1972); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518
(1972); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969); Terminiello v.
Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
113. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
114. Id.
115. The phrase "heckler's veto" originated in H. KALVEN, THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 140-45 (1965). A heckler's veto consists of the right to shout down a speaker
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freedom of speech may not be abridged merely because the content of such
speech may be offensive to some of the hearers. 1 16  Consideration of both
doctrines represents an attempt to reconcile the speaker's interest in
safeguarding his First Amendment right to communicate unpopular ideas to
the public with the state's interest in preventing violence that might result
from the speaker's message.
1 1 7
The theoretical alignment of the Heckler's Veto Doctrine with the Fighting
Words Doctrine offers an operating principle that is faithful to the findamen-
tal meaning of freedom of speech. If expression does not inflict preventable
injury and create a clear and present danger of a breach of the peace, it may
not be suppressed merely because its content disturbs hearers. 1 8 Restraint
of expression is limited to situations in which the utterance constitutes a
direct personal insult 119 which would "provoke the average person to retalia-
tion, and thereby cause a breach of the peace." 120
In Bachellar v. Maryland,12 1 the Court considered convictions for violat-
ing a statute which prohibited "acting in a disorderly manner to the distur-
because of the unpopularity of his message. To confer a heckler's veto on a speaker would
condition his right of free speech on the approval of an audience willing to resort to violence.
116. Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969).
117. Note, Hostile-Audience Confrontations: Police Conduct and First Amendment Rights, 75
MICH. L. REV. 180 (1976).
118. In West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), Mr. justice
Jackson eloquently expressed the rationale underlying the prohibition of a heckler's veto:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the
vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities
and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts.
One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of
worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote;
they depend on the outcome of no elections.
Id. at 638.
119. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971).
120. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 574 (1942).
121. 397 U.S. 564 (1970). Bachellar had participated in a demonstration protesting the Viet
Nam War in front of a United States Army recruiting station. The protesters marched in front of
the station carrying signs which said: "Peasant Emancipation, Not Escalation," "Make Love Not
War," "Stop in the Name of Love," and "Why are We in Viet Nam?" Id. at 566. Occasionally,
some of the demonstrators distributed leaflets to and conversed with persons in a crowd of
onlookers which had gathered. One police officer testified that "he 'overheard' some of the
marchers debate with members of the crowd about 'the Viet Cong situation,' and that a few in
the crowd resented the protest; '[o]ne particular one objected very much to receiving the circu-
lar."' Id. at 567.
Bachellar and some of the protesters entered the recruiting station and, after having been
refused permission to display antiwar materials therein, staged a sit-in. They were allowed to
stay until just before closing time when they were requested to leave. When the protesters
refused to leave the station U.S. marshals were summoned to eject them. The Court noted that
"[tihere is irreconcilable conflict in the evidence as to what next occurred." Witnesses for the
prosecution testified that the protesters were "escorted" outside by the marshals and police and
that the protesters then sat or lay down, "blocking free passage of the sidewalk." Allegedly the
protesters were bodily carried to a police wagon when they continued to block the sidewalk.
However, defense witnesses related a different version of events. Testimony was adduced that
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bance of the public peace, upon any public street." 122  The jury had been
instructed to return a guilty verdict if it found that the defendants had en-
gaged in any acts which would "offend, disturb, incite or tend to incite" a
number of people gathered in the same place. It was also instructed that
disorderly conduct may be found where refusal to obey a police command to
move could result in a breach of the pedce.
123
In overturning the convictions, the Court concluded that neither the mes-
sages on the placards nor the protesters' remarks to the crowd constituted
fighting words. 124 The Court thus reaffirmed the principle of Street v. New
York 125 that a speaker may not be silenced simply because his expression
offends its hearers or because onlookers object to peaceful demonstra-
tions. 126
The Court observed that the protesters could have been convicted merely
for their disobedience of police -orders or their disturbance of bystanders
who were offended by the obstructed sidewalk. Moreover, the convictions
could have been based solely on the jury's conclusion that the protest
amounted to "the doing or saying . . . of that which offends, disturbs, incites
or tends to incite a number of people gathered in the same area." 127 Be-
cause the protesters might have been punished solely "because they advo-
cated unpopular ideas," 128 the Court reversed the convictions.
As noted above, the Heckler's Veto Doctrine is, in one sense, merely the
logical converse of the Fighting Words Doctrine. Therefore, the cases 129
each protester was bodily thrown through the station door, landing on his back, that the protest-
ers did not completely block the sidewalk, and that no police command was given to disperse.
Rather, they contended, the police restrained them from standing and held them on the pave-
ment until they could be carried into the police wagon. Id. at 568.
When the protesters were on the sidewalk they sang "We Shall Overcome" and were sur-
rounded by other demonstrators bearing signs. From this evidence the Court concluded that
"petitioners remained obvious participants in the demonstration even after their expulsion from
the recruiting station." Id. at 568-69.
A crowd of between 50 and 150 persons was present at this time. A police officer testified
that "two uniformed marines in the crowd appeared angry and that a few other bystanders 'were
debating back and forth about Bomb Hanoi and different things and I had to be out there to
protect these people because they wouldn't leave.' " Id.
122. Id. at 564.
123. The jury was specifically instructed to find defendants guilty if they were responsible
for "the doing or saying or both of that which offends, disturbs, incites or tends to incite a
number of people gathered in the same area." It was also instructed that "[a] refusal to obey a
policeman's command to move on when not to do so may endanger the public peace, may
amount to disorderly conduct." Id. at 565 n.3.
124. The Court observed that "[a]ny shock effect caused by the placards, remarks, and peace-
ful marching must be attributed to the content of the ideas being expressed or to the onlookers'
dislike of demonstrations as a means of expressing dissent." Id. at 567.
125. 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
126. Id. at 592.
127. Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U.S. 564, 570 (1970).
128. Id.
129. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Tinker
v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Street v. New York,
394 U.S. 576 (1969); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
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which support the proposition that speech may not be restrained merely
because its message is offensive to some of its hearers may be examined as
cases establishing and developing the Heckler's Veto Doctrine as well as
limiting the scope of the Fighting Words Doctrine.
Mental Distress and the Future of Fighting Words
Since the announcement of the Fighting Words Doctrine in Chaplinsky, the
United States Supreme Court has never approved its application to those
forms of expression presented in the cases brought before it. This reluctance
to extend protection to the addressee's mental and psychological well-being
has also been reflected in the development of tort law. It is only recently
that courts have recognized an independent tort action for the infliction of
mental distress.' 30 In 1947 the American Law Institute amended the Re-
statement of the Law of Torts to provide that "[olne who, without a privilege
to do so, intentionally causes severe emotional distress to another is liable (a)
for such emotional distress, and (b) for bodily harm resulting from it."131
There has been a continuing expansion of the protection accorded to emo-
tional health. 'The limits of this area of judicial growth are presently inde-
terminable. 132 However, future applications of the Fighting Words Doctrine
will be likely to embrace a recognition of the protected status recently ac-
corded the interest in emotional well-being.
The history of the development of the Fighting Words Doctrine has been
characterized by a contraction of the category of those effects of offensive
speech which qualify as preventable "injury." Under the Court's present
formulation, offensiveness to a hearer's sensibilities or the public morality do
not warrant state censorship of speech. 133 However, during the three and
130. See note 7 supra.
131. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 46 (1934 & Supp. 1948). The present formulation of
the SECOND RESTATEMENT provides as follows:
§ 46(1) One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly
causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emo-
tional distress and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (1965).
§ 46 f. The extreme and outrageous character of the conduct may arise from the
actor's knowledge that the other is peculiarly susceptible to emotional distress, by
reason of some physical or mental condition or peculiarity. Id. at § 46, Comment f.
§ 46 i. Intention and recklessness. The rule stated in this Section applies where the
actor desires to inflict severe emotional distress, and also where he knows that such
distress is certain, or substantially certain, to result from his conduct. It applies also
where he acts recklessly, . . . in deliberate disregard of a high degree of probability
that the emotional distress will follow. Id. at § 46, Comment i.
§ 46 j. Severe emotional distress. The law intervenes only where the distress in-
flicted is so severe that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it. ...
Severe distress must be proved; but in many cases the extreme and outrageous
character of the defendant's conduct is in itself important evidence that the distress
has existed. Id. at § 46, Comment j.
132. W. PROSSER, supra note 7, at 50.
133. Rutzick, supra note 45, at 27.
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one half decades of the doctrine's evolution, the Court has not considered a
case in which injury resulted or was threatened which was more severe than
mere offense to the hearer's sensibilities. 1 34  The Court has indicated that
injury more severe than mere offense to sensibilities may justify silencing a
speaker, providing a clear and present danger of violence exists as well.
Has the Court collapsed the two branches of the original Chaplinsky for-
mulation into one? To the extent that individuals naturally react to the inflic-
tion of severe injury with violence, a clear and present danger of a breach of
the peace exists when such injury is inflicted. Moreover, the premise of the
breach of the peace branch of the Fighting Words Doctrine is that individuals
respond to expression with physical force because it has injured them and
hence act in self-defense. Thus, the Chaplinsky formulation of the Fighting
Words Doctrine-that restraint of expression is limited to those words
which "by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate
breach of the peace"-has been revised to define such words as those which
inflict injury and thereby incite an immediate breach of the peace. The
Chaplinsky formulation attempted to separate cause and effect and was un-
successful.
By limiting application of the Fighting Words Doctrine to contexts in which
a clear and present danger of a breach of the peace is created by the inten-
tional infliction of emotional harm, the Court forbade a State to restrain the
speech of one who intends to verbally inflict emotional injury upon a person
who is incapable of violently retaliating. For example, one with a physical
disability presumably presents no danger of a breach of the peace. However,
this contention ignores the fact that even a disabled person will, if suffi-
ciently provoked, attempt to retaliate and thereby create a clear and present
danger of a breach of the peace. Moreover, at a certain point, speech ceases
to be expression and may be regulated as conduct. For instance, shouting
"Boo!" at a cardiac patient135 is no more expressive than a physical assault
and may be treated as such. Governmental restraint here would not be con-
cerned with the content of the message incidentally communicated.
1 36
134. Although the actual holdings of the cases have "recognized as a valid state interest only
the prevention of violent reactive conduct," id., the Court has noted that a State may restrain
expression when "substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable
manner." Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971).
135. Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in
First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1482, 1501 (1975).
136. Professor Tribe demonstrates the problematic character of an attempt to develop a prin-
cipled distinction between speech and conduct:
The distinction between "expression" and "action" or "speech" and "conduct" is
essentially unhelpful because it asks a question which is answerable only if one has
already decided, on independent grounds, whether the act is protected by the first
amendment. The persistence of the distinction in the language of the Court may be
attributable to a reluctance to concede that the firit amendment has any relevance
whatsoever to political assassinations, radical bank robberies, or other violent modes
of expression, and a corresponding intuition that the efficacy of the first amendment
in other areas may be impaired by any attempt to bend its doctrines to such acts, so
as to uphold the government's authority to forbid them. For whatever reason the
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Thirty-seven years of judicial refinement of the Fighting Words Doctrine
suggest that the following legislative embodiment of the rule would survive
constitutional scrutiny.
1) Any person who, with intent to inflict severe emotional distress, ad-
dresses another using language which would be likely to inflict such harm
upon a person of ordinary sensibilities and to thereby provoke violent re-
taliation and who thereby creates a clear and present danger of a breach of
the peace shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
2) Any person who, with intent to inflict severe emotional distress and
with knowledge that another is peculiarly susceptible to severe emotional
distress by reason of some physical or mental condition or peculiarity, ad-
dresses that person using language which is likely to inflict such harm and
to thereby provoke violent retaliation and who thereby creates a clear and
present danger of a breach of the peace shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
3) For the purposes of §§ 1 and 2, one intends to inflict severe emotional
distress only when the infliction of such harm is the primary purpose of his
action.
Such an articulation of the rule embraces both cause and effect, thus open-
ing the door for a proper application of the Fighting Words Doctrine. Adop-
tion of this formulation would legislatively collapse the two branches of the
Chaplinsky standard and afford courts a solution to the problem of post-
Chaplinsky cases.
SWASTIKAS IN SKOKIE
The unique circumstances of Village of Skokie suggest that an injunction
forbidding the display of the swastika should be permitted under the Fighting
Words Doctrine. Unfortunately, the Illinois Supreme Court rejected the con-
tention that the display of the swastika in the proposed march constituted
fighting words. The court quoted extensively from Cohen to support its deci-
sion, inserting bracketed words so as to apply the statements to the case
before it, and concluded that the risk of the suppression of ideas outweighed
the injury concomitant with the display of the emblem. 137  The court then
distinction survives, it may be taken at most as shorthand for an inquiry into the
aim of the government's regulation .... While it would probably be better to bury
the distinction entirely, it is likely to remain in the vocabulary of the Court and can
do little harm if it is recognized that the words cannot and do not stand for a
distinctive approach to the resolution of first amendment issues.
L. TRIBE, supra note 33, at 601 (1978).
137. 69 Ill. 2d at 614-15, 373 N.E.2d at 24.
[Tihe principle contended for by the State seems inherently boundless. How is one
to distinguish this from any other offensive word [emblem]? Surely the State has no
right to cleanse public debate to the point where it is grammatically palatable to the
most squeamish among us. Yet no readily ascertainable general principle exists for
stopping short of that result were we to affirm the judgment below. For, while the
particular four-letter word [emblem] being litigated here is perhaps more distasteful
than most others of its genre, it is nevertheless often true that one man's vulgarity
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presented extensive quotations in support of the proposition that a hostile
audience's offended sensibilities or disagreement may not silence a speaker.
Because advance notice of the demonstration was given by the Nazis, the
court explained, offended viewers may simply stay away. As for those per-
sons presented involuntarily with the swastika, the court observed that they
had a burden to avert their eyes.
138
The details of the Nazi Holocaust need not be repeated. What is recorded
in history as mankind's darkest hour is common knowledge. For the rela-
tively few survivors of Hitler's Final Solution, the grisly memories of the
death camps are still all too vivid.' 3 9  To a survivor of the Nazi concentra-
tion camps, the swastika is a direct personal assault having all the effect of
physical force. 1 40  One Jewish resident of Skokie, a survivor of the
Holocaust, testified as to the effect that seeing the swastika has on him: "It
reminds me. It reminds me [ofl my closest family who were sent to death by
the swastika, and it reminds me [of] a threat that I am not safe with my life.
It reminds me that my children are not safe with their lives." 141 He further stated
that he does not presently intend to use violence against the Nazi party mem-
bers should they appear in Skokie, but that when he sees the swastika, he does
not know if he can control himself.142 When a survivor of the Holocaust
views the swastika, severe psychological impairment is inflicted and an in-
voluntary violent reaction results. He suffers physical injury and uncontrol-
lably strikes out in self-defense to stop the assault on his person. 143 The
Supreme Court of Illinois characterized the effect on a survivor of viewing
the swastika as "strong feelings" or "offense." This characterization ignores
is another's lyric. Indeed we think it is largely because governmental officials cannot
make principled distinctions in this area that the Constitution leaves matters of taste
and style so largely to the individual. Finally, and in the same vein, we cannot
indulge the facile assumption that one can forbid particular words without also run-
ning a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process. Indeed governments
might soon seize upon the censorship of particular words [emblems] as a convenient
guise for banning the expression of unpopular views.
id.
138. "As to those who happen to be in a position to be involuntarily confronted with the
swastika," the Court observed, "the burden normally falls upon the viewer to 'avoid further
bombardment of [his] sensibilities simply by averting [his] eyes." Id. at 618-19, 373 N.E.2d at
25, quoting Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210-11 (1975), quoting Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971).
139. D. RABINOWITZ, NEW LIVES: SURVIVORS OF THE HOLOCAUST LIVING IN AMERICA
(1976).
140. See note 139 infra.
141. Testimony of Sol Goldstein, Transcript at 83, Village of Skokie v. National Socialist
Party, Docket No. 77-2702 (Cir. Ct. of Cook County Ch. 1978).
142. 51 111. App. 3d at 284, 366 N.E.2d at 351.
143. David Guttman, Professor of Psychiatry at Northwestern University Medical School and
Chief of the Psychology Division of Northwestern University's Department of Psychiatry and
Behavioral Sciences, rendered the following professional opinion concerning "the psychological
impact" of the proposed march of the American Nazi Party in the Village of Skokie "upon
persons who are the object of such conduct." His statement of opinion was introduced into
evidence as Defendant's Exhibit 13 in Collin v. Smith, 447 F. Supp. 676 (N.D. II1. 1978):
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the evidence that severe psychological impairment rising far above the level
of offended feelings or sensibilities and resulting in physical symptoms will
be suffered.
The adult is threatened when his own prior experience, as part of a racial or ethnic
group, has been particularly painful, and has left him with a deep and abiding sense
of vulnerability in regard to his affiliation. The recipient of the insult is reminded
that his group is not only disparaged, but also under attack; if his past experience,
or the past experience of his group, has been one of vulnerability and persecution,
then he will experience the slur as a danger signal, one that links a traumatic past
to a potentially dangerous future. To the extent that the victim has a capacity for
rational thinking, he will not believe the content of the insult; but that same ration-
ality will lead him to take the threat aspect of the insult very seriously. While he
may not credit the disparaging connection between self, group, and evil, the public
announcement of a racial slur tells him that the deadly connection has already been
made in the racist mind, and that this connection is sufficient, in itself, to stimulate
the politics of persecution, and even murder. The victim's quite realistic
reaction -whether it takes the form of apprehension, outright fear, or retaliatory
rage-can be psychologically and even physically damaging. Depending on their
severity, such reactions can lead to mild agitation, to psychosomatic symptoms-
e.g., headaches, ulcers, or hypertension-or to outright mental breakdown. The
strength of the reaction to the racial insult will vary according to the temperament
of the victim, but also according to his experience-direct, or vicarious-of racial
violence. If the victim, or the group with which he identifies has been exposed to
situations in which racial insults were integral parts of a larger scenario of persecu-
tion and violence, then his subsequent reaction, to the racial slur alone, will also be
particularly violent, and psychologically unsettling. I am now referring to a well
known psychological principle, delineated by the noted developmental psychologist,
Heinz Werner: each component of a situation implicated in strong emotional arousal
can, by itself, and at a later date, stimulate the sentiments that were once gener-
ated by the total situation. This pars pro toto principle is at the basis of most
traumatic neuroses and phobias. By extension then, when individuals and/or the
group with which they are affiliated have been subjected to severe and repeated
traumatic experiences, these individuals will be prone to respond to any reminders
of their persecution in a total fashion, as if they were again subjected to the totality
of noxious conditions under which their painful associations were originally formed.
The Jews have known persecution in all times and in virtually all lands. Though
larger in scale, the Holocaust was only one among many mass murders, and many
reasonable Jews believe that it was not the last. Thus, Jews are aware that the
attitudes and words of even polite anti-Semitism can-all too easily-become the
preludes and accompaniments of murder. Accordingly, the Jew is not being
paranoid when he takes anti-Semitic epithets very seriously, and views them with
great apprehension, as intrinsic parts of a larger scenario that can include persecu-
tion and mass murder. What would be paranoia for others is sober realism for Jews.
This Jewish apprehension is, of course, magnified in regard to American Nazis,
who-through their symbols, their rhetoric, and their political acts-have openly
identified themselves with the party of genocide. Given the history that is shared
by identified Jews and committed Nazis, the words of any Nazi to any Jew have, by
definition, lost the usual intent and limitation of words: they are symbolic continua-
tions of the Holocaust, literal perpetuations of the climate of the Holocaust, and
preparations for a new Holocaust. No matter what words their placards bear, when
Nazis march in Skokie, their presence and their regalia says to Jews: "You thought
you escaped. You did not. We know where you are. When our strength is sufficient
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The severe psychological injury threatening Holocaust survivors upon con-
frontation with the swastika is precisely the type of harm to which the Fight-
ing Words Doctrine was designed to apply. As previously noted, the United
States Supreme Court has never before been presented with a case under
the Fighting Words Doctrine in which injury resulted or was threatened which
was more severe than mere offense to the hearer's sensibilities. The Court
has repeatedly rejected offense to sensibilities as injury sufficiently severe to
qualify for protection under the doctrine and in Cohen expressly noted that
only the invasion of substantial privacy interests in an intolerable manner
would trigger application of the rule.
Moreover, the Illinois Supreme Court states that those faced with involun-
tary confrontations with the swastika carry the burden of avoiding further
injury by averting their eyes. 144  However, the premise of the Fighting
Words Doctrine is that the infliction of certain forms of injury result in uncon-
trollable, violent retaliation. The Court would do as well to advise one suf-
fering from an epileptic fit to calm down. Uncontrollable responses are, by
definition, not subject to conscious direction. Moreover, the burden to avert
one's eyes was imposed on viewers in Cohen only because the message was
not personally directed at them. Survivors of the Holocaust, on the other
hand, satisfy the "actual addressee" test of Cohen since they may "reasona-
bly regard" the swastika as "a direct personal insult," and therefore they
have no duty to avert their gaze. 14 5 To assert that the infliction of severe
psychological injury which automatically results in uncontrollable, violent,
physical retaliation is not punishable is to abolish the Fighting Words Doctrine
entirely. That doctrine, like the right of self-defense, recognizes an individu-
al's natural right to ward off attackers.
The circumstances of Village of Skokie also fulfill both the objective and
subjective elements of the clear and present danger test. The First Appellate
District held that the swastika was inherently likely to elicit a violent reac-
tion when intentionally paraded in Skokie. 146  Further, the court noted that
the particular circumstances of Village of Skokie showed precisely that sub-
stantial numbers of citizens would be ready to strike out physically at those
displaying the swastika.
147
The Illinois Supreme Court stated that it was compelled to allow the swas-
tika's display by the authority of Cohen. However, the Court labored under
an erroneous impression since, rather than commanding that the swastika's
and when the time is ripe, we will come and get you." In effect, the Nazis agree
with the Jews that their seeming security in Skokie may only be a temporary hiatus
between two Holocausts.
In my estimation then, the psychological costs of the projected march would be
very great.
144. 69 III. 2d at 618-19, 373 N.E.2d at 26.
145. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971).
146. 51 111. App. 3d at 292, 366 N.E.2d at 357.
147. id, at 292, 366 N.E.2d at 356.
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display be allowed, that case supports the proposition that such activity is
enjoinable as fighting words. In Cohen, the Fighting Words Doctrine was held
to be inapplicable because the expression was "not directed to the person of
the hearer" since "[n]o individual actually or likely to be present could
reasonably have regarded the words on appellant's jacket as a direct personal
insult."148 The viewer's objections to the expression were based solely on
"personal predilection" which could not justify restraint of speech.' 4 9
Moreover, the Court noted, no clear and present danger of a breach of the
peace existed since there was "no evidence that substantial numbers of citi-
zens are standing ready to strike out physically at whoever may assault their
sensibilities with execrations like that uttered by Cohen." 150 Unlike the
expression considered in Cohen, the circumstances of the instant case satisfy
the criteria necessary to invoke the protection of the Fighting Words Doctrine.
As previously noted, the display of the swastika in Skokie is directed to
the person of the hearer and satisfies both the objective and subjective ele-
ments of the clear and present danger test.' 5 ' Moreover, Holocaust sur-
vivors are not reacting to its display because their sensibilities are being
offended. They are being forced to protect themselves from the infliction of
real harm. 152  Most significantly, the Court in Cohen observed that applica-
tion of the Fighting Words Doctrine was limited to circumstances in which
substantial privacy interests were invaded in an intolerable manner. Rather
than compelling the result reached by the Illinois Supreme Court, Cohen
decreed that the threatened infliction of severe psychological injury in cir-
cumstances such as those present in Village of Skokie should trigger applica-
tion of the Fighting Words Doctrine.
Invocation of the Heckler's Veto Doctrine is not persuasive here since the
addressee is reacting to the infliction of severe injury; he is not acting be-
cause he disagrees with the speaker's message. In fact, because the Nazis
would be free to conduct the same demonstration without the swastika, it is
clear that only the assaultive manner of their expression would be re-
strained. 153
148. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971).
149. Id. at 21.
150. Id. at 23.
151. See notes 146 & 147 supra.
152. See note 143 supra.
153. In Davis v. Norman, 555 F.2d 189 (8th Cir. 1977), the Court held that the application
and enforcement of a municipal ordinance (requiring enclosed storage of abandoned, wrecked,
or inoperative motor vehicles on public or private property for more than fifteen days) to the
symbolic display of a wrecked vehicle as a protest against police abuse of authority was "unre-
lated to the suppression of free expression" since "[b]oth the governmental interest and opera-
tion of the ordinance are limited to the noncommunicative aspect of [Appellant] Davis' conduct"
and "any infringement on [Appellant] Davis' First Amendment rights is incidental." Id. at 190-
91. The United States Supreme Court, in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), has
held that:
[W]hen "speech" and "nonspeech" elements are combined in the same course of
conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech
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The Illinois Supreme Court stated that it was unable to discern a "general
principle" which would allow it to forbid the swastika's display in Skokie as
fighting words and yet would not risk abridging constitutionally protected
expression. 154  Therefore, it concluded that the proposition is "inherently
boundless." 155 It is submitted that the Court prematurely surrendered,
leaving unfinished a task that is peculiarly within the ambit of the judicial
function. 156 Certainly this case is no less susceptible to principled decision-
making than the myriad other cases involving the clash of fundamental con-
stitutional principles.
The task of precisely refining a legal doctrine must be left to the deliber-
ate process of case by case applications. As Justice Holmes has observed, no
"faculty of generalization" can ever hope to achieve the same principled re-
sults in evolving a rule of law as "a series of determinations on the same
subject matter. '157  However, "the main constituent of the judicial process
is precisely that it must be genuinely principled. "158 The decision must rest
"on reasons with respect to all the issues in the case, reasons that in their
generality and their neutrality transcend any immediate result that is in-
volved."'159 Therefore, the validity of the proposition asserted here-that a
principled (i.e., general, neutral) formulation of the Fighting Words Doctrine
can apply to true fighting words yet not trample upon protected
expression-may be tested by application to various hypothetical situations.
element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms. . . [A]
government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power
of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest;
if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and
if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is not greater
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
Id. at 376-77.
Professor Tribe has argued that "regulatory choices aimed at harms not caused by ideas or
information as such are acceptable so long as they do not unduly constrict the flow of informa-
tion and ideas." L. TRIBE, supra note 33, at 581-82. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 89
(1949), where the Court upheld an ordinance which forbade soundtrucks from broadcasting in a
"loud and raucous manner" on the streets and noted that "[t]here is no restriction upon the
communication of ideas or discussion of issues by the human voice, by newspapers, by pam-
phlets, by dodgers."
154. 69 I11. 2d at 614, 373 N.E.2d at 24.
155. Id.
156. The Court thus invoked the principle that "you should not now do an admittedly right
action for fear you, or your equally timid successors, should not have the courage to do right in
some future case, which ex hypothesi, is essentially different, but superficially resembles the
present one." Of course, this principle leads to the conclusion that "nothing should ever be
done for the first time." Cornford, Excerpts from "Microcosmographia Academica: Being a
Guide for the Young Academic Politician," 3 J. LEGAL EDUC. 571 (1951).
157. Holmes, Codes and the Arrangement of the Law, 5 AM. L. REv. 1 (1870), reprinted in
44 HARV. L. REv. 725 (1931).
158. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HA.Fv. L. REv. 1, 15,
19 (1959).
159. Id.
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Would the principle forbidding the public display of swastikas in Skokie
also prohibit a march by civil rights activists in a racially segregated white
Southern community? Is it not likely that residents would suffer psychologi-
cal injury from a perceived threat to their way of life and would react vio-
lently? Today, of course, the marchers' goal -integration -is protected by
law, while the Nazis' goal-genocide -is illegal. However, a distinction
based upon the fragile concept of the present and perhaps temporary legality
of the marchers:' platform is wholly unsatisfactory, as can be seen by postulat-
ing instead that: the civil rights march occurred in 1953. Such a distinction
would limit constitutional protection to expression in support of the present
order and would undermine the very basis of self-government-peaceful
change. Moreover, it has been held that "the constitutional guarantees of
free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advo-
cacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to
incite or produce such action."
160
Nevertheless, the psychological disturbance that might be suffered by a
bigot is different in kind from that inflicted upon a Holocaust survivor in
Skokie. The unrest felt by the bigot is the result of his disagreement with
the marchers' advocacy of peaceful institutional change. To the extent that
the civil rights marcher knows that emotional distress is reasonably certain to
be inflicted by his activity, he intends to inflict it. Yet, his primary intent is
to advocate peaceful institutional change and the infliction of psychological
disturbance is merely ancillary to his exercise of that constitutionally pro-
tected right. Society must tolerate the injury incidentally inflicted by the
exercise of constitutionally protected rights. 161 On the other hand, the con-
centration camp survivor's psychological injury stems from the marchers' ad-
vocacy of his death. Although the advocacy of genocide is generally accorded
constitutional protection unless it is "directed to inciting or producing immi-
nent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action," 162 society
may constitutionally protect its members from the intentional infliction of
grave psychological injury which stems from advocacy of the genocide of the
hearer's race. Such advocacy may be restrained only when it produces a
clear and present danger of a breach of the peace. The Nazis' primary intent
is to inflict severe psychological injury, not to protest perceived injustices. It
is submitted that one may not act with a primary intent to inflict severe
psychological harm if such harm is indeed likely to result.
The Illinois Supreme Court observed that "one man's vulgarity is
another's lyric," 163 and therefore concluded that proscription of the swasti-
ka's display would risk the suppression of ideas. It is submitted that one may
not communicate his message when it constitutes a song of death aimed at
160. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
161. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
162. id.
163. 69 Ill. 2d at 614, 373 N.E.2d at 24.
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inflicting severe psychological injury on a captive and uniquely sensitive and
vulnerable audience.
One may recover damages for the intentional infliction of mental distress
where one acts in a manner "calculated to cause 'severe emotional distress'
to a person of ordinary sensibilities" and one actually inflicts such harm.
164
Moreover, when the defendant is aware of and takes advantage of the plain-
tiff's singular sensitivities, recovery will be allowed where there otherwise
would not have been tortious conduct.1 65  Of course, recovery may not be
granted for "mere vulgarities, obviously intended as meaningless abusive ex-
pressions." 166 However, the Illinois Supreme Court has observed that "a
line can be drawn between the slight hurts which are the price of a complex
society and the severe mental disturbances inflicted by intentional actions
wholly lacking in social utility." 167 The Court thus recognized that "peace
of mind is an interest of sufficient importance to receive protection from the
law against intentional invasion." 168 This interest in peace of mind is pre-
cisely that recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Cohen. It is
the interest in being free from the invasion of substantial privacy interests in
an intolerable manner-the interest that is protected by tile Fighting Words
Doctrine.
Of course, not all tortious expression/conduct rises to the level of a crime.
In balancing the individual's interest in unrestrained expression and the gov-
ernment's interest in regulating expression which rises to the level of a ver-
bal act, the First Amendment may forbid the imposition of criminal sanc-
tions for certain expression which is properly the basis of a cause of action
grounded in tort. 169  However, when one intends to inflict egregious injury
164. Knierin v. Izzo, 22 Ill. 2d 73, 86, 174 N.E.2d 157, 157, 164 (1961), quoting Slocum v.
Food Fair Stores of Fla., 100 So. 2d 396, 398 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1958). In State Rubbish Collectors
Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 240 P.2d 282 (1952), the Supreme Court of California held
that "a cause of action is established when it is shown that one, in the absence of any privilege,
intentionally subjects another to the mental suffering incident to serious threats to his physical
well-being, whether or not the threats are made under such circumstances as to constitute a
technical assault .. ." Id. at 336, 240 P.2d at 284-85. The Court thus rejected the argument
that tort liability for threats is limited to the context in which "immediate physical harm" is
threatened. Id. at 335-36, 240 P.2d at 284. In the instant case, although the immediate commis-
sion of genocide is not threatened, grave psychological injury will be intentionally inflicted by
the threatened consummation of Hitler's uncompleted task.
165. W. PRsossER, supra note 6, at 58.
166. Knierim v. Izzo, 22 Il. 2d 73, 86, 174 N.E.2d 157, 164 (1961).
167. Id. at 85, 174 N.E.2d at 164.
168. Id. at 87, 174 N.E.2d at 165.
169. "Assuming that specific individuals could proceed in tort under this theory to recover
damages provably occasioned by the proposed march, and that a First Amendment defense
would not bar the action, it is nonetheless quite a different matter to criminalize protected First
Amendment conduct in anticipation of such results." Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.
1978). See Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 342-43 (1974), where the Court held that a different
standard of First Amendment protection applies to allegedly libelous expression, depending on
whether the plaintiff is a public or private individual.
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in circumstances which qualify for application of the Fighting Words Doctrine.
such conduct may properly be subject to criminal proscription and prior re-
straint.
The law presumes that one intends the foreseeable consequences of his
actions. Just as "to publicly carry a Nazi flag into a synagogue would cer-
tainly be calculated to incite disorder," 170 to thrust a swastika in front of a
Holocaust survivor would certainly inflict severe psychological injury since
such harm is the inevitable, not merely foreseeable, result of such conduct.
As Justice Holmes observed, "[t]he most strident protection of free speech
would . . . not even protect a man from an injunction against uttering words
that may have all the effect of force." 171
CONCLUSION
Thus, despite the fact that the history of the Fighting Words Doctrine has
been characterized by a steady contraction of its scope, that principle, as
presently refined, represents a viable exception to the general rule of con-
stitutionally protected expression and serves to protect an individual's right
to be free from certain narrowly defined utterances which rise to the level of
a physical assault. Application of this principle in the context of the illustra-
tive case explored in this study recognizes the right of the American Nazi
Party to express its political beliefs by demonstrating in the Village of Skokie
despite the prospect of violent opposition. However, at the same time it
prohibits them from displaying the swastika in an intentional attempt to in-
flict severe emotional distress upon persons who are known to be peculiarly
susceptible to such injury by reason of a mental condition or peculiarity.
This result accommodates an individual's interests in both freedom of ex-
pression and emotional well-being. Any other result subverts an important
legally protected value by blindly overextending another value.
170. Anderson v. Vaughn, 327 F. Supp. 101, 106 (D. Conn. 1971).
171. Schneck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
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